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Abstract
If the United Nations system is to remain relevant, or even survive, the thinking to re-imagine and redesign contemporary glo-
bal governance will come from the Third UN. This article focuses on the ecology of supportive non-state actors – intellectuals,
scholars, consultants, think tanks, NGOs, the for-profit private sector, and the media – that interacts with the intergovernmen-
tal machinery of the First UN and international civil servants of the Second UN to formulate and refine ideas and decision-
making in policy processes. Despite the growth in analyses of non-state actors in global governance, the ‘other’ or ‘Third’ UN
is poorly understood, often ignored, and normally discounted. Some advocate for particular ideas, others help analyze or oper-
ationalize their testing and implementation; in any case, many help the UN ‘think’ and have an impact on how we think about
the United Nations.
Policy Implications
• Out-of-the-box thinking for UN deliberations should rely on independent analysts rather than just government officials
and international civil servants.
• Governments and philanthropies should provide more core and voluntary UN budgetary resources for global norms, stan-
dards, policy, and advocacy in order to move away from short-term sound-bites and toward evidence-based policy.
• Public-private intellectual and policy partnerships should be expanded to re-imagine how we work, communicate, and
think in a complex, interconnected, and anxious world.
• New nationalisms and populisms are metastasizing, which requires taking advantage of the post-COVID-19 moment, along
with climate change, to emphasize meaningful international cooperation.
Politicians, pundits, professors, and people on the street
are alternatively sounding the alarm about or applauding
multilateralism’s demise. While it may not yet have col-
lapsed, the rules-based international order is increasingly
untethered, lacking a lodestar. The host of intergovernmen-
tal organizations (IGOs) that emerged immediately after
World War II, or subsequently in response to discrete prob-
lems, are struggling to remain credible. The postwar order
was borne of progressive liberal values, yet it has also pro-
duced deep structural inequalities both within and among
states.
We can debate whether the United States and the West
are declining, absolutely or relatively, but agree that the
post-Cold War unipolar moment was short-lived. George
Magnus (2010) described the ‘uprising’, the current moment
of extraordinary change in the organization and structure of
the international system, as resembling the transformations
after the two world wars. Antonio Gramsci’s (1972, p. 276)
classic observation is apt: ‘The crisis consists precisely in the
fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born; in
this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms
appear’.
The COVID-19 pandemic etched in stark relief the extent
of our increasing interdependence and the acute need for
global cooperation when enthusiasm for it is in short supply.
With a global depression ($10 trillion or a 10 per cent drop
in global GDP) brought on by the pandemic, the planet will
remain hard pressed to respond to current and future
threats without more robust intergovernmental institutions.
The growing US-China competition for global leadership
and the rise of the digital age have ushered in paradigm
shifts in how we work, communicate, and think in a com-
plex, interconnected, and anxious world. The turmoil of
2020 echoes what Alvin Toffler (1970) described a half cen-
tury earlier in Future Shock – populations disoriented, dislo-
cated, and stressed from rapid social, economic, and
technological upheavals.
The COVID-19 era also has produced new forms of associ-
ation and social justice movements and highlighted the
need for a new kind of citizen politics. Is the UN, as a state-
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based institution, structured to meet the trans-national
crises of the day? Is it nimble enough to adapt and respond
to new realities? The short, yet generous, answer is ‘not yet’.
How can the UN adapt for the future, especially when
change approaches at warp speed? The UN Charter has pro-
ven flexible for some changing realities – for instance, the
invention of peacekeeping. However, adaptation let alone
transformation will require creative thinking to help turn the
UN super-tanker fast enough to meet global challenges.
Could our plight catalyze a rethinking of the 75-year-old
experiment and ensure that the UN is around to celebrate
its centenary in 2045?
If the world organization and the UN system are to
become more effective, or even survive, the thinking to re-
imagine and redesign contemporary global governance will
come from what we described a decade ago as ‘the Third
UN’. (Carayannis and Weiss, 2021; Weiss et al., 2009) If past
is prelude, new thinking will come neither from the polar-
ized First UN of member states nor the Second UN of secre-
tariats – lenses Inis Claude (1956) first used in his classic
text 65 years ago. In fact, as the pandemic ravages econo-
mies worldwide and rhetorical battles between governments
escalate, scientific communities are coming together. ‘While
national leaders play the blame game,’ Francis Fukuyama
(2020, p. 31) wrote, ‘scientists and public health officials
around the world are deepening their networks and connec-
tions’. Or as the New York Times noted, ‘While political lead-
ers have locked their borders, scientists have been
shattering theirs, creating a global collaboration unlike any
in history’. (Apuzzo and Kirkpatrick, 2020, Section A, p. 1, in
print edition).
If the ‘whole UN’ is to reflect the complexity of actors
necessary to address global problems, new ideational and
normative coalitions are necessary. What kinds of partner-
ships are required to build a multilateral system that can
respond adequately to pernicious challenges? Does the Uni-
ted Nations have a comparative advantage in idea-monger-
ing? If so, why are so few core and voluntary budgetary
resources (at most, 10 per cent) devoted to global norms,
standards, policy, and advocacy? (UNMPTFO and DHF, 2019).
Throughout its three-quarters of a century, the United
Nations has confronted bureaucratic challenges and major
changes in world politics; none has yet been lethal. Multilat-
eral organizations today reflect an era when consensual coop-
eration among states could address many problems needing
international collective action. COVID-19 and climate change,
however, are threats of a scale that defy action by a single
state or even a group of states working in concert. Indeed, the
pandemic has given us some sense of what a truly global cri-
sis means, one that disrupts everything from working or shop-
ping, to visiting parents or other countries, to attending
schools or weddings. As such, it has revealed the limits of the
UN’s structure, which solves transnational problems only
when the most powerful sovereign states assent. In fact, at
this juncture major and even minor powers are circling the
wagons, the very opposite reaction from the one required to
address the transnational existential threats to public health
and the human environment.
This article begins with a profile of the Third UN. It then
explores the politics of the ‘post’-COVID-19 world and the
dimensions of multilateral governance. It concludes with
how a fitter-for-purpose, ‘whole’ UN could think about that
world.
What is the third UN?
Think tanks, knowledge brokers, epistemic communities,
public-private partnerships, and expert networks (Andonova,
2010; Haas, 1992; Meyer, 2010; McGann and Sabatini, 2011;
Abbott et al., 2016) are phenomena found in both the aca-
demic and policy lexicons, but their intellectual role remains
marginal to analyses of the workings of such IGOs as the
United Nations. Texts on the UN, of course, discuss non-
state actors. (Weiss and Daws, 2018; Weiss et al., 2019) How-
ever, the bulk of analytical attention has concentrated on
nefarious non-state actors in violent conflicts and the diffi-
culties in the UN’s response to threats to peace and security.
While the operational role of nongovernmental organiza-
tions (NGOs) particularly as sub-contractors for IOs in devel-
opment and humanitarian action has been explored (Weiss,
1998), the ideational role of knowledge institutions in these
activities has not, despite discussions about transnational
advocacy networks (Keck and Sikkink, 1998).
We emphasize the dynamics of ideas and norms and,
more particularly, the impact of a subset of non-state actors
on how the UN thinks, and how we think about the UN.
The Third UN is the ecology of supportive non-state actors –
intellectuals, scholars, consultants, think tanks, NGOs, the
for-profit private sector, and the media – that interacts with
the intergovernmental machinery of the First UN and inter-
national civil servants of the Second UN to formulate and
refine ideas and decision-making in policy processes. Our
analytical toolkit must provide the means to move beyond
the binary frame of member states whose directives are car-
ried out by international civil servants; it must capture accu-
rately the politics of knowledge and norm production that
shape those directives and the ideas and narratives that
drive them.
The Third UN’s roles include research, policy analysis, idea
mongering, advocacy, and public education. Its various com-
ponents put forward new information and ideas, push for
alternative policies, and mobilize public opinion around UN
deliberations and projects. They also can impede progress,
by deploying the same methods; the polarization that
afflicts geo-political dynamics and left-right, secular-religious
societal battles are also reflected across the Third UN’s ever-
changing network of networks that helps the UN ‘think’.
Some Third UN actors advocate for particular ideas, while
others help analyze or operationalize their testing and
implementation. Participation varies with issues and geo-
graphic focus as well as timing. At any given time, any of
these non-state actors can be a member of the Third UN.
There are no barriers to entry or exit, and no permanent
membership.
As noted above, the literature on the advocacy and oper-
ational roles of NGOs is relatively well developed. While we
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do not address the operational role of non-state actors, the
lessons from this literature echoes our own conclusions
about their intellectual role in making the UN more effective
by helping it think. As with operational NGOs, the various
intellectual actors in the Third UN tend to me more flexible,
act more quickly, and are less constrained by the status quo
or government-imposed orthodoxies of the day. Their bud-
getary independence compared to UN secretariats also
makes autonomy and distance from conventional wisdom a
plus rather than a minus.
Despite the growth in analyses, the ‘other’ or ‘Third’ UN is
poorly understood, often ignored, and typically discounted,
even though some non-territorial players in issue-specific
global governance are more influential than many territorial
states. For example, the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC) for the laws of war and humanitarian principles;
the Federation Internationale de Football Association (or
FIFA) for the world’s most popular sport (football, or soccer);
and the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Num-
bers (ICANN) for the internet. Similarly, business corporations
have come together to participate in the development of
governance systems either at the urging of international
organizations, such as the UN’s Global Compact, or in
shared recognition of the need for new systems of coordina-
tion, such as the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial
Telecommunication (SWIFT). Moody’s Investors Service and
Standard & Poor’s Ratings Group renders judgments that are
authoritative enough to cause market responses. Individual
experts serving on the Inter-governmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) or eminent persons on other panels and
commissions have altered narratives and public policy.
The distinct value-added of informed scholars, policy ana-
lysts, and activists is to push out intellectual and policy
envelopes, to venture beyond what passes for conventional
intergovernmental wisdom. They provide crucial knowledge
and often counter-hegemonic ideas. For example, econo-
mists Mahbub ul Haq and Amartya Sen pioneered human
development ideas – which placed people rather than com-
modities at the center of the development process – and
found their way into UNICEF’s Adjustment with a Human
Face, challenging the orthodoxies of the day. Full employ-
ment, basic needs, and universal human rights were ideas
first developed by Third UN actors and agreed in UN for-
ums. Universities, independent commissions, expert groups,
NGOs and other Third UN actors have helped shape UN
development thinking for 75 years, decade by decade –
from the euphoria of the founding in 1945 and the First
Development Decade of the 1960s, to technical cooperation,
the struggle for a New International Economic Order, various
debt crises, human development, human security, and resis-
tance to the so-called Washington Consensus, globalization,
and global governance. It is impossible to ignore that such
‘outsider-insiders’ or ‘insider-outsiders’ are integral to the
world body. What once may have seemed insignificant now
is central for world politics and multilateralism.
The argument does not dispute state sovereignty as the
predominant characteristic of world politics. Indeed, with
the emergence of new nationalisms and populisms, it is
back with a vengeance. Analyses of world politics acknowl-
edge the extent to which the stage is crowded with a vari-
ety of actors, which is why ‘global governance’ emerged in
the late twentieth century as the term of art to encompass
multilateralism and public-private partnerships. (Weiss and
Wilkinson, 2019) For Barnett and Duvall (2005, p. 1), it has
‘has attained near-celebrity status’, leading Michael Z€urn
(2018) to calculate in 2018 that the growth rate of new titles
about global governance surpassed all others in interna-
tional relations.
Over the past century, a marked increase has taken place
in the number and the scope of international actors on the
world stage. The Yearbook of International Organizations
(Union of International Associations, 2018) provides the
time-series data over the 20th and 21st centuries. Their data
dramatically demonstrate the changing landscape of inter-
national organization. The total of 213 organizations in 1909
quadrupled by 1951 and reached 71,397 in 2018. Think
tanks have seen their numbers worldwide rise dramatically
in the last 20 years, coinciding with the rise of the knowl-
edge economy and a greater demand (and reliance) on
intellectual and social capital. By one estimate, over half of
think tanks globally are located in North America and Eur-
ope, but with Asia now registering the fastest growth. As of
2018, India and China follow the United States as the top
three countries with the most think tanks. (McGann, 2018;
McGann and Sabatini, 2011).
While our emphasis is on groups that foster multilateral-
ism, Charter values, and UN norms, these growing numbers
fail to convey a mixed picture, as the persecution of scholars
and indigenous, feminist, and LGBTQ groups illustrates in
many parts of the globe. (Goetz, 2020; Mason, 2019) In the
for-profit sector, the number of transnational corporations
(TNCs) and subsidiaries has also grown; in the 21st century,
they merit inclusion in the Third UN whereas earlier they
had been on the UN’s periphery because of their perceived
negative impact and image in the Soviet bloc and much of
the Global South. The UN Global Compact brought business
into UN discussions, although skeptics point to the leverage
of corporate financing, and argue that many corporate
actors, for example, fossil-fuel and garment producers, work
against such UN norms as those on climate change and
child labor. (Adams, 2021).
A skeptic might ask, ‘What’s new?’ Our answer, at least in
part, is that ‘more is different’. (Anderson, 1972, pp. 393–
396) Our argument is not the more-the-merrier. Rather, to
what extent do increased numbers in the Third UN reflect
an enhanced capacity to contribute to better global gover-
nance and strengthened multilateral institutions? The
growth in the kinds and numbers of actors permits –
indeed, requires and facilitates – a networked structure of
global interconnections, where various types of partners
contribute to global governance. The quantitative growth of
IGOs, NGOs, and TNCs over the 20th and 21st centuries and
of think tanks over the last few decades constitutes a quali-
tative change in global governance. Earlier, many problems
had only a few or even no non-state actors active in analy-
sis, advocacy, or operations within an issue area. The
Global Policy (2021) 12:1 © 2021 The Authors. Global Policy published by Durham University and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
The ‘Third’ UN 7
quantitative and qualitative growth in network means that
global challenges now have a complex web of international
stakeholders working to understand and address them.
Moreover, technology has accelerated the nature and speed
of growing interactions. As Abbott et al. (2016) remind us,
intergovernmental organizations are no longer the dominant
nor fastest growing global governance institutional form.
Recent years have witnessed an expansion of networked
forms of public authority that may not include IGOs or
states at all. They provide opportunities to apply new knowl-
edge and ideas to solve intractable problems and shape
political orders; they can help decentralize the UN system
by providing entry points for private actors to participate in
global governance; they can at times overcome the political
gridlock paralyzing states and UN secretariats.
Public-private partnerships are not new to the United
Nations. In fact, most organizations of the system maintain
some kind of public-private partnership program. As non-
state-led governance has grown exponentially in some sec-
tors, particularly the environment, so has the academic liter-
ature about these authorities. In discussing environmental
governance, Liliana B. Andonova (2010, p. 25) defines these
partnerships as ‘agreements for collaborative governance
between public actors (national governmental agencies,
sub-national governments, or IOs) and non-state actors
(foundations, firms, advocacy organizations, or others), which
establish common norms, rules, objectives, and decision-
making and implementation procedures for a set of policy
problems’. Anne Marie Goetz (2020, p. 166) writes that ‘[f]
eminist engagement with international institutions is . . . a
paradigmatic example of how a relatively power-deprived
social group’ by building partnerships with states willing to
champion gender equality can ‘challenge the power of
sovereign states’.
UN activities are diverse and members of the Third UN
are as well – intellectuals, scholars, consultants, think tanks,
NGOs, the for-profit private sector, and the media. The Third
UN is anything but monolithic; it does not have the clear
and coherent definitional boundaries of member states or
international civil servants. Membership in the Third UN var-
ies, depending on topics and timing. The International
Olympic Committee is not active in the development of a
COVID-19 vaccine, but the Gates Foundation is. FIFA is not
engaged in follow-up to the Paris Agreement, but the Earth
Institute at Columbia University is. For many actors in the
Third UN, informing UN decision-making is not their only, or
even their primary mandate; but for us, it is an essential fea-
ture. The Third UN’s non-state-led governance in its various
forms has much to offer the UN in terms of ideas, technol-
ogy, and practical solutions.
Knowledge brokers and brokering
The UN has a decades-long history of originating, incubat-
ing, consuming, and disseminating powerful ideas and social
knowledge – from human rights to full employment, from
climate change to the limits of GNP as a meaningful mea-
surement of development (Jolly et al., 2009; Weiss et al.,
2005). The Third UN as knowledge system has been an intel-
lectual partner of the intergovernmental machinery since
the organization’s inception (Svenson, 2016). The three UNs
together can be usefully understood as a progressively
evolving and symbiotic knowledge economy whose accu-
mulated experience since 1945 has been harnessed with
varied success to address some of the world’s most complex
challenges.
While ‘expertise’ is a relative and value-laden notion, the
need for the UN Secretariat’s staff in headquarters to
improve its analytical capacity and strengthen its knowledge
management for development, humanitarian action, and
international peace and security has long been recognized
by thoughtful international civil servants. This need figured
notably in the 2000 Report of the Secretary-General’s
Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (the ‘Brahimi
Report’), but it has remained aspirational. The opposition to
the Second UN’s enhanced wherewithal for political analysis
goes back to Dag Hammarskj€old’s rejection of efforts to
build an intelligence capacity within the Secretariat; for him,
it was exclusively the First UN’s realm – he may have been
particularly uneasy to ruffle superpower feathers at the
height of the Cold War (Urquhart, 1994). In the 1990s, the
outgoing head of the (then) UN Department of Political
Affairs (DPA) and former under-secretary-general of the
(then) Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Marrack
Goulding (1997), highlighted the need for analysis and pro-
posed an Interdepartmental Policy Analysis Group in a
report to Secretary-General Annan.
This debate was revived due to the profound policy and
operational challenges posed by the wars in Afghanistan
and Iraq following the attacks of 9/11 and the global war
on terror, accompanied by a growing recognition of com-
plex policy challenges along the relief-to-development spec-
trum. They require more multidisciplinary analyses – linking
political, security, economic, and social issues. Both Brahimi
and Goulding argued that the effectiveness of Secretariat
analyses was limited by a narrow focus on political issues,
which neglected, for example, political economy. That UN
policy makers place high priority on context-specific knowl-
edge and analysis was further underscored by the conclu-
sion of a 2003 DPA-led evaluation of knowledge
management for strategic planning. The ‘Knowledge Project’
– a Rockefeller Foundation-funded collaboration with the
Social Science Research Council’s Conflict Prevention and
Peace Forum (SSRC/CPPF) – recommended streamlining the
internal policy process and strengthening the UN’s ability to
draw on external expertise by calling upon research institu-
tions and think tanks.
A decade and a half after the Brahimi Report, the 2015
reviews of UN peace and development operations and
architecture – the High-Level Independent Panel on UN
Peace Operations (HIPPO) and the Advisory Group of Experts
on Peacebuilding (AGE) – both reiterated the requirement
for a greater capacity to think. They returned to questions
about what the UN can effectively do in contemporary
crises, and what analytical resources were needed. They also
asked whether the UN’s knowledge resources drew on
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sufficiently diverse perspectives and were equipped to
understand issues that cut across regions and bureaucratic
boundaries.
On his appointment in 2017, Secretary-General Antonio
Guterres committed to seeking expertise from outside the
normal insider UN channels: ‘We will be open to new ideas
. . . drawing on and commissioning research and inputs from
a wide variety of internal and external sources . . . [and]
ensure that fresh thinking and outside perspectives are
introduced into the policy making process’ (UN, 2017). In
modest ways, that has been the case. There is more integra-
tion and coordination than two decades ago. The Secretariat
has established in-house mechanisms to improve informa-
tion-sharing and decision-making among different parts of
the UN system as well as between headquarters and the
field. The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) have
underscored the links among such seemingly disparate
issues as politics, economics, human rights, public health,
the environment, technology, and media. The COVID-19
aftermath will only reinforce the requirement for multidisci-
plinary perspectives; everything from the rotation of peace-
keepers to the priorities in humanitarian and development
projects are affected.
The need for real-time intellectual inputs has given promi-
nence to external partners – knowledge brokers from the
Third UN, especially those seasoned observers (sometimes
former staff members) who know how to navigate UN corri-
dors. One reason that UN staff respond – and sometimes lis-
ten – to policy advice provided in expert briefings by
trusted brokers is that policy makers are bombarded with
information and are unable to dig as deeply into issues as
they would like; daily firefighting invariably takes prece-
dence. Demand for analysis is also high because civil ser-
vants rotate – from field to headquarters, from the UN
Secretariat to other parts of the system. Such staff move-
ments may be beneficial for multilateral diplomacy, inter-
agency cooperation, lessons-learning, and morale; but they
make it harder to acquire and retain in-depth understanding
of specific issues and places. It also can be useful for imagi-
native UN staff to seek a ‘cover’ for proposals – pointing to
an outside source, permits bureaucrats to have plausible
deniability.
It is thus preferable for UN policy making to speak about
‘knowledge brokers’ rather than think tanks because not all
think tanks broker and not all brokers think. Knowledge bro-
kerage at the UN comes in many forms, including the ‘re-
volving door’ of human capital. As Barnett and Finnemore
(2018, p. 54) observe: ‘Many UN staff and field personnel
have varied careers and move back and forth between UN
appointments, jobs within their own governments at home,
and positions in the private sector, universities, and NGOs’.
Many individuals are ‘shape-shifters’ whose membership at
any moment in one of the three UNs reflects the extent to
which they are embedded in larger social networks.
The use of knowledge brokers has been on the rise in the
last two decades in all sectors: they are ‘people whose job it
is to move knowledge around and create connections
between researchers and their various audiences’ (Meyer,
2010, p. 123). More specifically, they facilitate the transfer of
knowledge between policy or academic researchers and
practitioners; their positions inherently entail tensions. Sys-
tematic interactions with UN staff create opportunities for
these actors to inform and shape policy; understanding UN
constraints can also help outside institutions and individuals
shape their own policy work. Brokers need to be close
enough to policy makers to understand in real time their
requirements but distant enough from policy processes to
maintain analytical legitimacy and independence. Unlike
advice from many ‘hired-gun’ consultants, effective knowl-
edge brokers – to paraphrase the Brahimi Report – are not
there to tell the UN what it wants to hear, but what it needs
to hear.
Knowledge brokering is multidimensional (Kislov et al.,
2017). In addition to producing knowledge through in-house
research, knowledge brokers are responsible for moving
knowledge, from the academy and NGOs to governments
and UN secretariats. This often requires identifying and
curating research products that might be useful to bring
into UN policy discussions and facilitate the transfer of what
brokers understand to be necessary knowledge for policy
makers to effectively address specific problems.
Knowledge brokers also pursue the twin processes of
translating and convening, which often go hand-in-hand
with mobilizing evidence. Translation has two elements.
First, it requires taking complex ideas and jargon and mak-
ing them readable, digestible, and operationally relevant for
practitioners. Such ‘translations’ are often done through
research digests and literature reviews, expert briefings, con-
venings, and policy memos. Second, translation requires
reframing ideas in research papers and academic publica-
tions into actionable recommendations. It is often said that
scholars are good at telling practitioners what is broken but
terrible at helping them think about how to fix it. The trans-
lation function of the knowledge broker is thus critical.
Some observers have argued that successful brokerage, in
fact, produces a new type of knowledge. ‘Brokered knowl-
edge’ makes available ‘more robust, more usable knowledge
that ‘serves locally’ at a given time; knowledge that has
been de- and re-assembled’ (Meyer, 2010, p. 123).
The ability to bring actors together and facilitate conver-
sations that are problematic in formal settings is another
crucial brokerage function. Cynics dismiss many UN gather-
ings as empty talk shops, but ideas are precursors for action.
Convening UN policy makers around a shared analysis is
critical to making research and external ideas accessible. It
also contributes to coordination and policy alignment.
Everyone agrees with the need to transcend UN bureau-
cratic silos, but it remains as hard as ever. The role of knowl-
edge brokers, and particularly those considered trusted
‘honest brokers’ helps determine when the First and Second
UN will act on the information and ideas provided by exter-
nal actors because they know the timing and relevance of
such analysis in a policy process. Effective brokers can maxi-
mize uptake by ensuring that there is a demand for external
policy advice in the first place, and often by observing and
accompanying the uptake process itself.
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The politics of knowledge – what is produced, consumed,
transferred, and valued as well as how the UN is informed
and by whom – reflect the tensions and competition
between different types and sources of knowledge. Output
is important not only for UN policy making but also for
international norm development and dissemination. Whose
knowledge is most valued, and why? The push for evidence-
based policy making has raised the political stakes of who
exactly within the Third UN gets to help the First UN and
the Second UN think. A testament to that reality is the out-
cry about the ‘influence’ of alternative voices from emerging
powers on UN thinking (Lynch, 2019).
That knowledge and power are linked is not new. As Hans
N. Weiler (2009, p. 487) reminds us, ‘reciprocal legitimation’
between power and knowledge is clear accompanied by the
‘ever-increasing degree to which political decisions are justi-
fied by reference to a particular body of knowledge’. The
bulk of scholarship about the United Nations and the main
substantive issues on its agenda emanate from universities,
specialist research institutes, and learned societies in North
America and Western Europe (Gordenker and Jonsson,
2018). During World War II, the notion that the UN would
be a major instrument of Washington’s foreign policy
attracted support from US foundations. For example, the
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace actively pro-
moted research on a new organization by scholars and by
officials from the League of Nations, which was helpful for
the post-war expansion of multilateralism (Lavelle, 2020).
Such private support has continued sporadically since,
including the $1 billion gift from the business leader Ted
Turner in 1997 to create the UN Foundation and Better
World Fund. Two professional associations, the Society for
International Development (founded in 1967) and the Aca-
demic Council on the United Nations System (founded in
1987), are part of policy research networks focused on the
problems and prospects of the UN and multilateralism more
generally.
Think tanks and knowledge brokers around the UN have
an ethical responsibility to be particularly attuned to the
politics and hierarchies of knowledge, and to their own posi-
tions within the knowledge hierarchy. Self-reflection is as
essential to the credibility of the Third UN as it is to all
social research – that is, the process of questioning continu-
ally the research process, and of examining and consciously
acknowledging the assumptions and pre-conceptions that
researchers (or their funders) bring to any study. Knowledge
brokers work at the edges of the academy and policy. They
thus constantly must scrutinize their practices, their broker-
ing devices, and the benefits and drawbacks of their ‘double
peripherality’ because ‘they are partially connected to the
two worlds they bridge’ (Meyer, 2010, p. 122).
Trends for funding research complicate reflection. Philan-
thropies increasingly shun funding basic research. Previously
generous member states are tightening their belts and are
under pressure from taxpayers to justify investments in
applied research. The growing tendency to call upon ‘con-
sultants’ and research-on-demand has dire repercussions for
research design and practice. Contractors compete with
academic institutions for dwindling funding. Donor-driven
research and high-impact philanthropy are setting agendas
and demanding quick results that often are incompatible
with the pace and process of scientific inquiry.
Funding challenges, together with the information revolu-
tion, mean that research institutions need to change how
they do business. What will happen to longer-term perspec-
tives and to independence, and to the relationship between
evidence and policy? From where will funding come to sup-
port a variety of research, especially if evidence runs con-
trary to donor wishes and perspectives? The Third UN will
need to create a demand for basic research from within the
First and the Second UNs, make persuasive cases to funders
for the value of evidence, and be more transparent about
sources and conditions.
Two decades ago, the Washington-insider Ann Florini
(2000, p. 3) noted: ‘Although the state system that has gov-
erned the world for centuries is neither divinely ordained
nor easily swept away, in many ways that system is not well
suited to addressing the world’s growing agenda of border-
crossing problems’. The presence of alternative inputs other
than from states and international civil servants has become
integral to the UN system’s policy processes and delibera-
tions. Knowledge and normative production would simply
not be the same without the Third UN.
Re-imagining the future of global institutions
The dynamics of change invariably involve the creation,
refinement, and implementation of ideas. Explanations for
continuity and change also entail technology, politics, and
economics; but at a minimum, ideas matter in opening
space for experimentation and innovation.
Indeed, both individually and through new alignments
such as the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South
Africa), emerging powers are engaging more directly in key
normative debates about accelerated development and pov-
erty alleviation; how international interventions for peace
could and should be conducted; and how major UN organi-
zations could and should contribute to a more just order.
Research suggests the extent to which the Global South has
long been a source of global norms (Acharya and Plesch,
2020; Ayoob, 2020; Helleiner et al., 2014; Weiss and Roy,
2017).
If the trend lines are governments’ flexing their sovereign
muscles and escalating popular nationalisms, it is research-
ers, intellectuals, and epistemic communities worldwide who
will need to come together to define the new global order
that we want and need. In many ways, research collabora-
tions and conversations are underway. The global project to
redefine multilateralism, however, must become more multi-
disciplinary and inclusive; it also must avoid the politiciza-
tion of critical issues that has impeded cooperation, and
lately even conversations, by governments. The decision-
makers from UN-friendly member states and philanthropies
who believe in the multilateral project would do well to
augment support for research cooperation and access to
knowledge.
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A sub-set of the Third – particularly think tanks, aca-
demics, research NGOs, and other ‘norm entrepreneurs’ –
traditionally has helped the First and Second UNs think, and
this task looms large as the future is defined by speed and
interdependence. Significant innovations in technology
accompany an era of increasing inequality, new security
threats, and looming environmental and health disasters.
Understanding the cause-and-effect results of information
technology, inequality, and insecurity will be crucial to
understanding geo-politics. How we research, collaborate,
mobilize, and organize will be shaped by technology in the
digital age, aptly labeled the ‘fourth industrial revolution’.
If the world organization is to survive and remain rele-
vant, the vast bulk of ideas necessary to meet these chal-
lenges will come from the Third UN. Successful international
cooperation increasingly is perched on a three-legged stool.
Member states and their governments remain essential, as
do international secretariats. However, they cannot ignore
the complementary analytical and advocacy skills of actors
and mechanisms of the Third UN; states and international
civil servants simply must collaborate with the bevy of per-
formers on the world’s stage.
As we argue above and elsewhere, the power of ideas is
an underappreciated UN legacy. Ideas change the way that
we perceive and talk about issues. They permit the redefini-
tion of interests – that is, what matters and why – as part of
setting agendas and prioritizing actions. They provide the
basis for the formation of new coalitions and networks. They
find homes in institutions and are reflected in budgetary
and personnel allocations. Former businessman and UN
under-secretary-general Maurice F. Strong led the Canadian
International Development Research and Policy Task Force,
which over two decades ago determined that networks of
think tanks, academics, and research NGOs contribute to
more effective policy:
[T]hey generate new knowledge; they generate ‘op-
erational’ knowledge; and the disseminate knowl-
edge locally. The first contribution is a function of
the interdisciplinary quality of the networks . . . The
second is related to the mixture of academic and
non-academic work that the networks perform.
And the third is related to the constant interaction
between distant colleagues and global disciplines
. . . and local activities . . . These three qualities of
interdisciplinarity, operationality, and contextualiza-
tion are each important to the production of
knowledge (Quoted in Stein et al., 2001, p. 20).
Non-state actors are key to local governance, especially
where the state is weak or predatory. The Third UN can – as
it has historically – play not only a significant but also a
more formidable role in shaping international public policy
and also in monitoring commitments. An important current
example is ‘naming and shaming’ for the SDGs; the Second
UN by itself cannot do neither adequately. As noted earlier,
many actors in the Third UN are smaller, more flexible, bet-
ter networked, and less bound by the constraints that dic-
tate deliberations in the forums attended by senior and
junior officials from both governments and secretariats.
Moreover, the Third UN’s think tanks and knowledge brokers
serve not only as bridges between knowledge and policy;
but increasingly they also span policy makers and their pub-
lics – essential to bringing reluctant governments along.
States, especially major powers, need to be pressured to
listen and act because inertia is the easiest path. Secretariats
need to be open to ideas, but the costs of being ahead of
the conventional wisdom can be not only embarrassing but
potentially costly to career advancement. Third UN actors
need to know when to bring ideas in, when to make noise,
and when to allow members of the First and the Second
UN to take credit for initiatives. In short, brokers are also
essential to either be a creaky wheel or to grease one.
That said, we should recognize the clear limitations of
non-state actors in global governance despite their ability to
network across national borders. By themselves – that is,
without state sponsors and secretariat facilitation – they
cannot eliminate poverty resulting from globalization, fix
global warming, or halt mass murder and migration. Govern-
ments, especially, but UN officials as well, need to take their
responsibilities seriously.
The current context is grim. The onslaught against multi-
lateralism is a fact of international life; it will continue and
perhaps become more intense and widespread. The new
nationalisms and new populisms are metastasizing, not
diminishing. Nativist-populist ‘ages’ are everywhere: of
Trump, Putin, Erdogan, Xi, Modi, Bolsonaro, Duterte, Neta-
nyahu, al-Sisi, Orban, Maduro, and rising right-wing cabals
worldwide. In addition, an ancient, yet newly pernicious,
challenge is the relationship between the First and Second
United Nations. The P-5 (China, France, Russia, the United
Kingdom, and the United States) control discourse and
purse strings; their ideological competition impedes cooper-
ation and innovation. The temporary respite immediately
after the end of the Cold War and prior to China’s rise has
given way to growing polarization in the Security Council
and a tighter grip on the Secretariat. These geo-political
constraints are unlikely to dissipate any time soon; more-
over, we are unlikely to see a UN Secretary-General with any
degree of independence in the near term.
Yet, optimism is a prerequisite for this business, which all
three United Nations can nourish. They can recognize the
absolutely essential roles played by the others – and reach
out where appropriate to encourage and assist them to play
their roles more effectively. The First and the Second UNs,
in particular, can provide better information about proposed
actions and easier access to meetings and facilities, which
help the Third UN to circulate, rattle bureaucratic cages, and
mobilize support.
More particularly, the Second UN can make better use of
outside knowledge networks, as demonstrated conclusively
since 1987 by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC). It is crucial to draw on networks of first-class
intellectuals worldwide who understand the impact of inter-
national policy. Following the IPCC model, three principal
organs (the Security Council, General Assembly, and ECO-
SOC) could have established in 2020 an intergovernmental
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panel on health, inequality, and the economy to respond to
the pandemic’s effects – and they still could pull together
scientific expertise from across the planet. The Third UN’s
value-added is to utter what the Second UN cannot or will
not – reflecting the ever-present danger of self-censorship
to avoid offending key governments or regional groups.
There is an ongoing requirement for UN secretariats to
regularly open their proverbial windows and let in fresh air.
Secretaries-general have sought to foster a culture of pre-
vention, but we now require a culture of evidence and inno-
vation, which requires more than better digital technologies,
as Guterres has advocated. It demands data (and not just
big data) for decision-making and innovation in how the UN
system catalyzes, mobilizes, advocates, and consumes evi-
dence. Policy cannot be informed through reductionist
approaches from disciplinary or organizational silos. In no
context, let alone global problem-solving, can business as
usual continue.
We are not suggesting necessarily the need for more for-
mal mechanisms. Far from it. The process of social knowl-
edge production is ad hoc, messy, iterative, and cumulative.
This is often how research and ideas are born. We need a
shift to a post-bureaucratic, less hierarchical, more net-
worked organizational policy model that decentralizes think-
ing to all levels of the policy-making process. Such
approaches would permit coordination rather than central-
ization of strategic thinking, and encourage a system-wide
consumption of knowledge. The experience of some
national bureaucracies suggests that such approaches would
‘devalue hierarchy and strengthen horizontal relations’, but
‘require a rich knowledge-based environment to function
successfully’. (Stein et al., 2001, p. 17).
The First UN and Second UN would be well served to
invest substantially more in, and strengthen ties with,
knowledge networks. The Third UN’s emphases would use-
fully shift to what many of its most creative members do
best, namely generate facts, figures, and knowledge as well
as advocate alternative policies to address trans-boundary
problems that threaten human dignity and survival.
The most fundamental step forward is to strengthen part-
nerships among the First, Second, and Third United Nations.
In particular, lessons emerge from history about experience
with how best to exploit intellectual inputs from the Third
UN.
There is a compelling need to strengthen partnerships
not just in states that have been traditional supporters of
multilateralism but also challengers to the liberal status quo.
The impetus will not come from states; UN secretariats in
close collaboration with the Third UN will have to jump into
the fray and rethink orthodox notions about what partner-
ships can make a difference. The underlying principles,
approaches, and values that shape global governance insti-
tutions and norms will be partly determined by who is set-
ting the rules, and more specifically who is contributing
new thinking to help shape and encourage respect for those
rules. Some western officials fear opening floodgates to
ideas ‘not invented here’. Yet, diversifying the voices within
the Third UN with access to UN policy debates is necessary
not only because ideas should reflect the planet’s diversity,
but also because Third UN actors can help build bridges
between pertinent stakeholders. These bridges span secre-
tariats and governments, and governments and their pub-
lics.
The evidence-collection abilities of non-state actors have
vastly improved with the information revolution; but in
order to reap the benefits, decision-makers require assis-
tance in navigating information overload to make better
decisions. In discussing how to train US defense industry
analysts, an insider summarized: ‘The paralyzing issue for
today’s policy leaders is how to figure out which data-driven
claims are credible and which are not’. (de Mesquita et al.,
2020) This generalization certainly applies to decision-mak-
ers in UN member states and secretariats. Governments
require research, which is why many have used their opera-
tional visibility in the UN (including increased investments
and troop contributions) to grow the demand for research
from their own nationals and provide greater visibility and a
bigger platform for research to be consumed by all three
United Nations.
A compelling need is to rethink research funding. Private
philanthropy needs to return to financing basic and applied
research rather than abandoning this critical function to
powerful states that prioritize pay-offs for their foreign poli-
cies. The increasingly onerous conditions governing policy
research are often at the opposite end of the accountability
spectrum from public funding’s priorities, the near-term
objectives of national security and economic growth. Of
course, private and corporate philanthropy is not devoid of
self-interest and can be as opaque and unaccountable as
government funding.
Instead, a new ‘research compact’ among research institu-
tions, governments, philanthropies, and business would bet-
ter harness the potential of the social sciences for improving
human lives. (SSRC, 2018) It could help set research agen-
das, guide funders, and encourage more equitable collabo-
rations, while mitigating political blow-back. Third UN actors
across the Global South could also leverage the research
compact to mobilize resources at the regional and interna-
tional levels to help shed light on the power imbalances
between their national governments and the wealth and
influence of corporate interests, especially from media and
technology conglomerates. Moreover, as repositories of data
and key actors in the new ecosystem of research, social
media companies have a particular responsibility to partici-
pate in supporting research by the Third UN and making
data widely and freely available for social research. At the
same time, the Second UN needs to open itself and its data
to researchers who can help with experimentation and new
thinking. The move to improve and integrate the UN’s data
collection systems would make such partnerships more
plausible and feasible.
Vehicles for ideas also matter. For example, commissions
of eminent persons and high-level panels should be
demand-driven so that there are ready-made consumers for
the products. The most effective ones have occurred when
governments were searching for alternative approaches. For
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example, the concrete normative and operational decisions
about the ‘responsibility to protect’ by the 2005 World Sum-
mit reflected ideas launched by the International Commis-
sion on Intervention and State Sovereignty, was staffed by a
university-based research directorate. That experience was
distinct from blue-ribbon groups that focused on disarma-
ment, prevention, or human security whose research and
interpretations had little immediate policy impact.
Less visible and off-the-record deliberations also have
their place in helping the UN think; often they have been
crucial and out of the limelight. A crucial and never-ending
challenge – indeed, a bottom-line for successful reform – is
to establish and maintain an environment in which creative,
multidisciplinary thinking and policy analysis can flourish. As
such, the Second UN needs to regain a capacity to ‘think’.
This means strengthening the institutional capacity to gen-
erate and disseminate original ideas, to create spaces within
secretariats to think creatively. For a culture of evidence and
innovation to take hold, the Second UN must recruit and
retain professionals of outstanding quality and provide
incentives to think and write independently; support
research adequately; reward originality as opposed to rou-
tine report writing or diplomacy; strengthen multidisciplinary
and multi-agency dialogue; enrich analysis with field experi-
ences; and avoid orthodoxy. Such experiences and skillsets
are absent from the numerous personnel reports that
emphasize geographic distribution, gender parity, and age
profiles. In short, the Second UN needs to return to intellec-
tual leadership. As such, partnerships with Third UN actors
will be essential.
Conclusion
The International Commission on Multilateralism (2016)
sought to understand where the UN fits in the broader
international system on the eve of the current Secretary-
General’s mandate. More important than their concrete sug-
gestions was the portrayal of a humbling reality: the United
Nations is often a minor player. With the Security Council
deadlocked – as it was in the face of the political and
humanitarian disasters in Myanmar and Syria, and then the
COVID-19 pandemic – the search for other multilateral solu-
tions is inevitable. To what extent will this undermine the
UN? Enthusiasts who celebrated the 75th anniversary, even
if remotely, should have asked: If the dimensions of global
governance are determined outside the United Nations,
what are the implications for the UN at 100? If it exists, will
it be more a relic than a vital part of world order?
We write as a lethal pandemic has fundamentally chal-
lenged both contemporary thinking about global gover-
nance – its constitutive elements, internal constitution, and
outcomes – as well as how it can be improved. In the
midst of an economic calamity and fears about additional
waves of COVID-19, it is hard to imagine that one needs
to make the case for urgently rethinking global problem-
solving. But we do. Current efforts, in both the scholarly
and policy worlds, are too bound to the constraints of the
contemporary international system – including the feeble
UN system. The world has figuratively if not literally shut
down.
But the 21st century is not the 19th or 20th; there will not
be less interdependence and globalization, and certainly not
fewer pandemics. The most urgent task is to reinforce the UN
system’s crumbling foundations and build intellectual coali-
tions. Patrick Soon-Shion – the surgeon, inventor, scientist,
and owner of the Los Angeles Times – emphasized this require-
ment: ‘The COVID-19 pandemic is a health nightmare but also
a scientific dream. It has prompted scientists from across the
world to collaborate in real time as never before with the
understanding that we are all in this together’ (Harari et al.,
2020). We could envision similar collaborations across the
social sciences, philanthropy, and business at a moment when
the need to reimagine more just, more representative interna-
tional institutions could not be greater.
The next few decades are likely to bring unprecedented
economic, political, social, health, and ecological upheavals;
they also will bring opportunities. New evidence and new
insights necessitate calling into question shibboleths about
what works and what does not. The ‘whole UN’ should recall
the comment reportedly made by John Maynard Keynes
when asked about inconsistencies in his thinking: ‘When I get
new information, I change my views. What do you do, Sir?’
Consistency and rehashing formulas from the past in the
face of new problems or new data is the hobgoblin of little
multilateral minds wherever they exist – in the First, Second,
or Third United Nations.
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